Wednesday, September 2, 2020

Essay for 2011 Summer Transportation Institute free essay sample

Gabriela Meza 24 July 2011 Essay for 2011 Summer Transportation Institute Some of the profession targets that I have set up for myself are entirely unsteady and hazy right now since I despite everything need to have the option to encounter somewhat a greater amount of life to check whether something will adjust my perspective. I am keen on Engineering however I am not that certain about which field would be the best to seek after or that would intrigue me the most. The two fields I find most intriguing are Civil and Aerospace designing. That is the reason I did the V. E. S. T. E. D Academy at Cal State L. A, yes it interested me more in the field of designing in light of the fact that the vast majority of the things we did was hands on labs yet it despite everything left me doubting what field would be the best. I am keen on the field of Transportation since it connects to Civil Engineering since it goes about as a sub division. We will compose a custom article test on Article for 2011 Summer Transportation Institute or on the other hand any comparative point explicitly for you Don't WasteYour Time Recruit WRITER Just 13.90/page It intrigued me since it is put together or focused with respect to the vehicle frameworks like structural building depends on the plan and structure of numerous structures, scaffolds, streets, and channels. I felt since I am keen on Civil building it is fascinating to discover progressively about the field of Transportation since it is centered around the activity, structure, and the arranging of transport offices so as to make the development of individuals simpler. I am not that certain about this field of designing but rather who realizes I may wind up loving it more than Civil and Aerospace that I may choose to seek after just Transportation or I may choose to do both Transportation and Civil Engineering. My enthusiasm for this Summer Transportation Institute is exceptionally tremendous in light of the fact that we will investigate numerous things that can get me out later on. It will permit me to investigate what it resembles to have a profession in transportation and on the off chance that it may be something I need to seek after throughout everyday life, the SAT planning courses for school would likewise be an advantage since a few of us don't prepare the right way or don't even prepare at all for a major test like the SAT , and the PC preparing and CAD is a favorable position since I am not that acquainted with PCs and it would be fascinating to get prepared on the best way to work things in the PC and other stuff. The entire groundwork for math, material science, composing, and study aptitudes will profit everybody since it will grow our insight somewhat more on things we definitely know or it will acquaint us with new subjects we are not that acquainted with. By and large, SIT can help me in arriving at my objectives by permitting me this extraordinary chance to become familiar with the field of Transportation just as different things we are not educated at school or home.

Saturday, August 22, 2020

Sexism in Othello Essay -- Othello essays

Othello: the Unquestionable Sexismâ â   â Shakespeare’s unfortunate show Othello highlights sexism as normal passage †at first from Brabantio and Iago, lastly from Othello. Give us access this article investigate the events and seriousness of sexism in the show.  In â€Å"Historical Differences: Misogyny and Othello† Valerie Wayne ensnares Iago in sexism. He is one who is practically unequipped for some other viewpoint on ladies than a misogynist one:  Iago’s stress that he can't do what Desdemona solicits infers that his dispraise from ladies was real and handily delivered, while the acclaim requires work and motivation from a source past himself. His inadequacy is all the more amazing in light of the fact that somewhere else in the play Iago shows up as an ace rhetorician, yet as Bloch clarifies, ‘the sexist author utilizes talk as a methods for revoking it, and, by augmentation, woman.’ (163)  Indeed, even the respectable general respected the chauvinist comments and implications of his old, along these lines building up an inexcusable demeanor toward his beautiful and unwavering spouse. Angela Pitt in â€Å"Women in Shakespeare’s Tragedies† remarks on the Moor’s chauvinist treatment of Desdemona:  Desdemona has, in this manner, some very genuine blames as a spouse, including her very own will, which was clear even before she was hitched. This doesn't imply that she justifies the horrendous allegations flung at her by Othello, nor does she in any capacity merit her passing, however she is somewhat answerable for the shocking activity of the play. Othello’s conduct and mounting desire are made increasingly understandable on the off chance that we recall what Elizabethan spouses may expect of their wives. (45)  In the initial scene, while Iago is communicating his disdain for the general Othello for his choice... ...motivation to a similar degree, or much more prominent than, men; and that men are energy driven moreso than are ladies. The tables are turned on sexism at the very peak of the show!  WORKS CITED   Jorgensen, Paul A. William Shakespeare: The Tragedies. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985.  Pitt, Angela. â€Å"Women in Shakespeare’s Tragedies.† Readings on The Tragedies. Ed. Clarice Swisher. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996. Reproduce from Shakespeare’s Women. N.p.: n.p., 1981.  Shakespeare, William. Othello. In The Electric Shakespeare. Princeton University. 1996. http://www.eiu.edu/~multilit/studyabroad/othello/othello_all.html No line nos.  Wayne, Valerie. â€Å"Historical Differences: Misogyny and Othello.† The Matter of Difference: Materialist Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare. Ed Valerie Wayne. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Friday, August 21, 2020

The principles of right and wrong Essay

The standards of good and bad that are acknowledged by an individual or a social gathering) â€Å"the Puritan ethic†; â€Å"a individual with antiquated values† (an arrangement of standards administering profound quality and worthy direct) inspiration dependent on thoughts of good and bad The philosophical investigation of virtues and rulesâ known as good way of thinking is a part of theory that tends to inquiries concerning moralityâ€that is, ideas, for example, great and shrewd, good and bad, goodness and bad habit, equity, and so forth. Significant parts of morals include: Meta-morals, about the hypothetical significance and reference of good recommendations and how their fact esteems (assuming any) might be resolved; Normative morals, about the commonsense methods for deciding an ethical strategy; Applied morals, about how moral results can be accomplished in explicit circumstances; Moral brain research, about how moral limit or good office creates and what its inclination is; and Descriptive morals, about what virtues individuals really maintain. May be characterized as the moves an individual makes on himself to guarantee his proceeded with endurance over the elements. It is an individual thing. At the point when one is moral, it is something he does himself by his own choice.† [1] According to originator L. Ron Hubbard’s lessons, Scientology morals is predicated on the possibility that there are degrees of moral direct. ethical quality (worry with the differentiation among great and shrewd or good and bad; right or great lead) profound quality (inspiration dependent on thoughts of good and bad) Profound quality (from the Latin moralities â€Å"manner, character, legitimate behavior†) is a feeling of social lead that separates goals, choices, and activities between those that are acceptable (or right) and awful (or wrong). An ethical code is an arrangement of profound quality (for instance, as per a specific way of thinking, religion, culture, and so forth.) and a good is any one practice or educating inside an ethical code. Unethical behavior is the dynamic restriction to profound quality, while flippancy is differently characterized as an ignorance of, lack of concern toward, or doubt in any arrangement of good measures or principles.[1][2][3][4][5] Morality has two head implications: In its â€Å"descriptive† sense, profound quality alludes to individual or social qualities, implicit rules or social mores that recognize good and bad in the human culture. Portraying profound quality thusly isn't making a case about what is equitably right or wrong, yet just alluding to what is viewed as right or wrong by individuals. Generally good and bad acts are named such in light of the fact that they are thought to cause advantage or mischief, yet it is conceivable that numerous ethical convictions depend on partiality, numbness or even hatred.[clarification needed] This feeling of the term is tended to by elucidating morals. In its â€Å"normative† sense, ethical quality alludes legitimately to what is good and bad, paying little mind to what explicit people think. It could be characterized as the direct of the perfect â€Å"moral† individual in a specific circumstance. This utilization of the term is portrayed by â€Å"definitive† articulations, for example, â€Å"That act is immoral† as opposed to unmistakable ones, for example, â€Å"Many accept that demonstration is immoral.† It is regularly tested by moral agnosticism, which dismisses the presence of an any good truths,[6] and upheld by moral authenticity, which underpins the presence of good realities. The standardizing use of the term â€Å"morality† is tended to by regulating morals. Islamic morals (Ø £Ã¸ ®Ã¹â€žÃ¸ §Ã¹â€š Ø ¥Ã¸ ³Ã¹â€žÃ¸ §Ã¹â€¦ Ùšø ©), characterized as â€Å"good character,† truly came to fruition bit by bit from the seventh century and was at long last settled by the eleventh century.[1] It was in the long run molded as an effective amalgamation of the Qur’anic lessons, the lessons of the Sunnah of Muhammad, the points of reference of Islamic law specialists (see Sharia and Fiqh), the pre-Islamic Arabian custom, and non-Arabic components (counting Persian and Greek thoughts) installed in or incorporated with a by and large Islamic structure.[1] In spite of the fact that Muhammad’s lecturing created a â€Å"radical change in virtues dependent on the approvals of the new religion and the current religion, and dread of God and of the Last Judgment†, the innate act of Arabs didn't totally vanish. Later Muslim researchers extended the strict ethic of the Qur’an and Hadith in monstrous detail. The center of the Western morals should be Judeo Christian qualities. In any case, the genuine Judeo-Christian morals has little distinction from the Islamic morals. This is on the grounds that Muhammad (harmony arrive) came in a similar line of prophetic religion, as Moses and Jesus; he showed similar ethics, inside a similar structure of Semitic convention. Muslims revere the sameâ€One and Onlyâ€Creator, as Jews and Christians do. In the event that we receive a progressively comprehensive â€Å"Abrahamic† see, Islam can no more be considered â€Å"the other† To put it plainly, there is little contrast between the center morals of the West and Islam. This is in spite of the realism and utilitarianism is currently predominant in specific circles, which is despicable to Islam. Be that as it may, actually, it is detestable to the genuine Judeo-Christian custom as well.. Hameed proceeds to clarify why there is no genuine contrast among Islam and Western morals, however identifying with his contentions will require an entire diverse article. Progressively essential, is to comprehend what Hameed is doing here. He’s playing with the terms utilized so they will accommodate his view. Obviously, when you disregard the importance of ‘Islam’, ‘Judeo-Christian’ and ‘Western’, you can reach the resolution that their center morals are the equivalent. Hameed is correct that the center of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is comparative. They are completely founded on the equivalent Messianic laws that created around 3000 years prior. In any case, the large distinction between Judeo-Christian laws and Islamic laws is that the Judeo-Christian culture created. Jewish researchers all through the ages didn't avoid reevaluating the Messianic laws as per the ebb and flow standards. Thus, in the event that it says in the Torah â€Å"an eye for an eye†, the Jewish researchers clarified this is just an issue of installment. Laws which were applicable to a prior sort of society, for example, Levirate relationships (a custom which necessitated that a man wed his brother’s widow if the expired kicked the bucket childless) are currently basically taboo as per Jewish law. It is sufficient to investigate another of Hameed’s answers about stoning to comprehend that in Islam that isn't the situation. In the event that stoning was recommended 1400 years prior as the discipline for infidelity, at that point it will be the discipline today, regardless of how uncouth it appears. Hameed can continue forever concerning why stoning might be utilized in specific cases and why infidelity is awful to such an extent that it is requires stoning. That has nothing to do with morals. No one today asserts that infidelity is ‘good’. In any case, stoning as a discipline, is viewed as boorish. No Jew today would think about batter an individual to the point of death, in spite of it being plainly composed as discipline in the Torah. Truth be told, passing as discipline isn't acknowledged today by Judaism, and the Jewish state doesn't rebuff genuine guilty parties, such a sequential killers and fear based oppressors, with capital punishment. Morals: picking standards of direct as a controlling way of thinking. Ethics: adjusting to a standard of right conduct. Here is the place I see the distinction. Ethics, no doubt, are decides and principles that we are advised we should â€Å"conform† to when choosing what is â€Å"right† conduct. At the end of the day, ethics are directed to us by either society or religion. We are not allowed to think and pick. You either acknowledge or you don’t! We are educated by society and religion that you â€Å"shall not lie† or you ought to â€Å"give to the poor† or you should â€Å"love others as you would have others love you† or you should accomplish something since it is â€Å"your moral obligation.† The key issue with â€Å"morals† is that you are required to â€Å"conform to a standard of right behavior† and not question that â€Å"conforming† or you are not a â€Å"moral† individual. However, once more, where do these â€Å"morals† originate from to which we are required to â€Å"conform†? That's right, from soc iety as well as religion, however not from YOU, and that’s what annoys me. Morals, then again, are â€Å"principles of conduct† that YOU CHOOSE to oversee your life as a directing way of thinking that YOU have decided for your life. Once more, call it semantics in the event that you need, however I see a major contrast among â€Å"conforming† and â€Å"choosing.† With MORALS the â€Å"thinking has been done;† with ETHICS there’s an opportunity to â€Å"think and choose† your own way of thinking for controlling an amazing direct. I like to watch motion pictures about the â€Å"mafia† or TV shows like the â€Å"Sopranos.† The individuals on these shows are amazingly committed individuals to their families and religions, however they have by one way or another â€Å"morally justified† their activities of executing, taking, and lying. How is it that these incredibly dedicated family men and apparently gave individuals from the Catholic religion imagine that what they are doing is good is a puzzle to me. However they wear their â€Å"crosses,† cross themselves, love their children, and dedicateâ themselves to the â€Å"family† while executing individuals who disrupt the general flow. Presently that’s a fascinating ethical quality. Be that as it may, ethics don’t stop there. Think about all the many societies who have entirely unexpected thoughts of ethical quality. A few societies think it is consummately fine to have the same number of spouses as they need; some think just a single wife is good according to God. A few societies imagine that it is fine to take if

Tuesday, May 26, 2020

How a College Essay Service Can Help You With Your College Application

How a College Essay Service Can Help You With Your College ApplicationA college essay service like this could mean the difference between earning a spot on the college admission list and having to wait a long time for the college entrance exam. Here's how it works. An educator, an instructor, maybe even your parent, may give you a copy of the essay, and you will then have to read it and make some suggestions as to how to improve upon what was submitted.The person that you've been given the assignment from will be a professional who is skilled in editing such a writing assignment. He or she will make sure that you've answered all the questions and made an outline for your paper.When you receive a copy of the college essay, you are allowed to mark any areas of concern you may have in the introduction, the first paragraph, the second paragraph, the conclusion, and the thesis statement. You will also be asked to provide some final edits of your own in the last few paragraphs.Once the pro fessor has approved this reading, the professional that you've been assigned will make a copy of the entire assignment and will make sure that it is properly graded by means of an assigned grading guide. This grading guide will also have a section that details when you should start on each chapter. For each section of the essay, the guide will give you tips and pointers as to where to start and what you should avoid.What you see is what you get; if the instructor, that you've been assigned, tells you to make changes that will affect your grade, then you should make them. If you come to a consensus on a line of questioning you didn't like, it will not be held against you.You will also not be penalized for taking too much time to revise your assignment or grade it. So, if it's your last college application, and you really want to getin, or you're hoping to improve your grade, this is the first step you should take.That's how a college essay service can be beneficial to your college ap plication. If you have the right attitude about the essay service, you will do well in the college admissions exam.

Saturday, May 16, 2020

Tips for Learning Students Names and Remembering Them

Learning your students names is essential if you want to create a good rapport and establish a comfortable atmosphere in the classroom. Teachers who learn students names quickly, help reduce feelings of anxiety and nervousness that most students experience during the first few weeks back to school. Here are a variety of tips and tricks to help you remember names and ease those first week jitters. Seating Chart Use a seating chart for the first few weeks of school until you can put names and faces together. Greet Students by Name Everyday greet your students by name. When they enter the classroom make sure to use their name in a short comment. Pair Students in Groups Create a quick questionnaire about what the likes and dislikes of your students are. Then group them together according to their choices. The point of this activity is to help you remember students by associating them with their preferences. Wear Name Tags For the first week or so have students wear name tags. For the younger children, place the name tag on their back so they wont feel the urge to rip it off. Name Cards Place a name card at each students desk. This is not only a great way for you to remember their names, but it will help the classmates remember as well. Memorize by Number Beginning the first day of school, strive to memorize a set number of students each day. You can memorize by number, color, name etc. Use a Mnemonic Device Associate each student with something physical. Relate the students name, such as George, with the Gorge. (Quinn with a pin) Associate Related Names A great memory trick is to associate a name with a person you know that has the same name. For example, if you have a student named Jimmy who has short brown hair, then imagine your brother Jimmys long hair on little Jimmys head. This visual link will help you remember little Jimmys name in no time. Create a Rhyme Create a silly rhyme to help you remember students names. Jim is slim, Kim likes to swim, Jake likes snakes, Jill can juggle, etc. Rhymes are a fun way to help you learn and remember quickly. Use Photographs Have students bring in a photo of their-self on the first day, or take a picture of each student yourself. Place their photo next to their name on your attendance or seating chart. This will help you correlate and remember names with faces. Create Photo Flashcards To help you remember students names quickly, take photos of each child and create photo flashcards. Photo Memory Game Take photos of each student and then create a photo memory game with them. This is a great activity for the students to learn their classmates faces, as well as give you a chance to learn them too! Play Im Going on a Trip Game Have students sit in a circle on the carpet and play the Im going on a trip game. The game begins like this, My name is Janelle, and I am taking sunglasses with me. The next student says, Her name is Janelle, and she is taking sunglasses with her and my name is Brady and I am taking a toothbrush with me. Go around the circle until all students have gone and you are the last to go. With you being the last person to recite all the students names, you will be surprised how many you remember. Being able to identify a student by name make a take a few weeks but with these tips and tricks you will learn them in no time. Just like all the other back to school procedures and routines, it takes time and patience, but it will come.

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

The Most Iconic Figures Of The 20th Century - 1306 Words

Dictionary.com defines the word â€Å"Icon† as â€Å"a person or thing that is revered or idolized†, that sums up John Lennon pretty well; he was an icon in many different ways. He was a musician, an activist, and a legend. Born on October 9th, 1940 in Liverpool Maternity Hospital in Liverpool, England, John Lennon was born, and so began what would become a journey that would lead to Lennon becoming one of the most iconic figures of the 20th century. His Father was often away, but he continued to support Lennon and his Mother with regular checks, until his Father stopped in 1944, and he wouldn’t return until six months later, where after many heated debates, Lennon’s Father forced him to choose between his Mother or him, at the age of 5, and after choosing his Father twice, saw his Mother begin to walk away and at that moment decided to choose her instead. John Lennon wouldn’t see his Father again until he was 25. Despite what happened with his parents, he would live the rest of childhood with his Aunt and Uncle. When questioned about his upbringing, Lennon said â€Å"Part of me would like to be accepted by all facets of society and not be this loudmouthed lunatic poet/musician. But I cannot be what I am not ... I was the one who all the other boys parents—including Paul s father—would say, Keep away from him ... The parents instinctively recognised I was a troublemaker, meaning I did not con form and I would influence their children, which I did. I did my best to disrupt every friendShow MoreRelatedPhyllis Wheatley : The Iconic Cornerstone Of Equality1126 Words   |  5 PagesKyle Martinez AMST 201 Professor Woo 2 March 2016 Phyllis Wheatley: The Iconic Cornerstone of Equality Phyllis Wheatley was one of the most iconic figures in the American Revolution on the side of the colonists because she was the first black female to be published in America. This was very important because it was a kickstart in generating authentic American culture and a lot of it. Phyllis Wheatley was born in Africa and brought over to be sold in the slave trade. She was purchased by John WheatleyRead MoreStar Wars Pop Culture Icon1043 Words   |  5 Pagesthat does not have a soundtrack out, t-shirt even action figures that go along with it. So where did this idea of marketing out come from? Simple. Star Wars. Thanks to the cultural influence of George Lucas’ Star Wars there is not a director in Hollywood that doesn’t look to cash in through other forms of movie sales. In late 1975 George Lucas began directing something that would soon become one of America’s biggest works of the 20th century. Firstly, it is apparent that Star Wars has gained aRead MoreRobert Rauschenberg And John Cage1388 Words   |  6 PagesIn the early 20th Century, western history has entered a new era with the fast development of modernization, industrialization and the technologies. The machines took over the human labor they gradually replace the important role of human in the process of making and change the ways people live, started the fast pace, high speed of modern lifestyle. Modern art approached with a number of painter, sculptures, poets who individually or collectively to redefine through around this century. The new artRead MoreMalcolm X was a Symbol of the Civil Rights Movement1573 Words   |  6 Pagesbigotry that surrounded Malcolm is what made him have such a passion to become an educated scholar in the ideas of racial segregation and hate. Though Malcolm X was a controversial figure in the eyes of the public, his influence on American society did not go unnoticed, as Times Magaz ine named Malcolm X to be one of the ten most influential people in American history.. X has been portrayed through the years in such literature as Malcolm X, a Life of Reinvention, by Manning Marable.Marable’s book becameRead MoreSydney Opera House994 Words   |  4 PagesThe Sydney Opera House is a performing arts centre located on Bennelong Point in Sydney, New South Whales Australia. The Sydney Opera House is a masterpiece and an iconic building of the 20th century and has created itself as the Australian Symbol in many countries. The Sydney Opera House is one of the most famous architecture jobs of all time. It made in an expressionist design, with a series of â€Å"shell like† buildings, each composed of sections of a hemisphere of the same radius, forming the roofsRead MoreHollywood Studios And The Movie Industry Essay1353 Words   |  6 PagesAmerican Films and continue to be affluent today. Hollywood was the birthplace of movie studios, which were of great importance to America’s public image in the movie industry. The earliest and most affluent film companies were Warner Brothers Pictures, Paramount, RKO, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, and 20th Century Fox, each of whom owned their own film production sets and studios. Universal, United, and Columbia Pictures were also considered noteworthy, despite not owning their own theaters, while DisneyRead MoreVernacular Architecture Identity Essay3577 Words   |  15 Pageselements it essentially mirrors international stylistic movements (Drew 2006). This essay will examine Australian architecture s short history in the search for a cogent Australian architectural idiom. The period which will be analysed is the Mid 20th Century which was a time when Modernism became dominant and the Sydney School reacted against the utilitarianism of this movement. Two arguments will be explored within a critical framework to answer the questi on; has there ever been a distinct AustralianRead MorePropaganda During The 20th Century And The Onset Of World War1741 Words   |  7 Pagesin its most simple definition, propaganda is â€Å"the manipulation of opinion.† However, the modern propaganda which Americans are most familiar with is well summed up by the Merriam-Webster definition: â€Å"ideas or statements that are often false or exaggerated and that are spread in order to help a cause, a political leader, a government, etc.† The beginning of the 20th century and the onset of World War I marked the beginning of the true modern propaganda era, and throughout the 20th century, propagandaRead MorePostmodernism And Its Impact On Modern Culture Essay1722 Words   |  7 Pagesa â€Å"renewed appreciation for popular culture that often remixes other art works and pop culture in order to create something new† (Suto, 2013). Collins (1992) agrees with this and says it was a significant cultural movement th at developed in the 20th century following the modernism period, where there was a â€Å"move away from abstraction and geometrics to the overly familiar and massed produced†, and invention was replaced with rearticulation, meaning that a lot of what we see now, especially in termsRead MorePablo Picasso s Influence On Art1070 Words   |  5 Pagesprobably the most important figure of 20th century. That means Pablo Picasso conquered western art is by storm. Who became very famous before the age of 50.Born in Spain, he becomes the most well-known name in modern art, with his unique style and view for artistic creation. His art made a big impact on the art world and that had been no other artists, prior to Picasso. He had lots of following of fans and critics who like his creation. Even his art career spanned long period, Pablo Picasso is most known

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Managing Challenges to Growth for Entrepreneur- MyAssignmenthelp

Question: Discuss about theManaging Challenges to Business Growth for an Entrepreneur. Answer: Starting and growing business presents a lot of challenges for the owner of Gilbert Fresh Market, Mr. Gilbert. He had learned that all successful companies faced similar challenges when they were growing. However, there are a few things that set them apart from those companies that failed. This manager appreciates that growth is change, and change is risky. Whenever Gilbert opens a new branch, he ensures none of his stores is weaker than others. Unlike managers who remove their existing staff and shifting them when their organizations reach this stage of growth, he trains his own staff. He believes this is the only way to ensure there is no unbalance in his organization. Another unique thing that Gilbert does is hiring the right people all the time. He understands that the challenges that a company must go through when it is growing require experienced, visionary, and hardworking people. To avoid the risk of failure, he has groomed his children to work in his organization from bottom level and created an atmosphere that enables them to work their way up, acquiring experience in the process. He fosters his own people. By training his own staff and fostering his own people, Gilbert has demonstrated that he has transitioned from a business owner to entrepreneur. According to Grafton, an entrepreneur understands that for a business to grow, the entrepreneur himself must grow fast. When growth begins, the leader quickly learns that he can only do so much and he needs the help of others to meet the needs of customers adequately.[1] To meet these needs, other studies have indicated that the business owner must evolve from being a doer to a manager of employees and then to a manager of managers.[2] Doing this may appear very easy, but Alfredo says that is not the case.[3] He holds that managers often find it difficult to face the fact that they must rely on others to complete certain tasks. However, entrepreneurs go the extra mile and train their employees to be their own managers. After doing this, they can delegate effectively. When Gilbert gets to the point where he is delegating tasks and relying on his employees to drive the business, he must be a leader and coach. Coaching requires that he spends a lot of time getting to know people and understanding their emotions.[4] Gilbert has a good understanding of his children and a few other workers and gives them an opportunity to work their way to the top. By giving them this opportunity, he gives himself the advantage of knowing them and their abilities better. Gilbert also demonstrates that he is an entrepreneur by giving young people opportunity to lead. He believes that people should fail when they are young to develop a high tolerance for failure. Research has shown that entrepreneurs understand that upgrading never ends and growth is a continual process.[5] Failure also young people to learn in the right time that having a smooth-running machine in an elusive dream, so they have good tolerance to failure, take risks, and work hard. By mentoring young people to take over leadership of his business, Gilbert is creating a high-performance family.[6] Through this, he will reduce the amount of time he needs to spend putting out fires and the number of mistakes needing to be corrected every day. Ordinary managers often fail to plan for more growth and put in place better processes.[7] However, Gilbert being an entrepreneur, he is offering the right leadership and his business has great prospects. Bibliography DAngelo, Alfredo. "Theoretical Foundations of International Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurship Studies." International Entrepreneurship, 2016, 75-95. doi:10.1057/9781137520036_4. Grafton, Melissa. "Growing a business and becoming more entrepreneurial: the five traits of success." Strategic Direction 27, no. 6 (2011): 4-7. doi:10.1108/02580541111135526. Hisrich, Robert D., and Veland Ramadani. "Entrepreneurial Business Planning." Springer Texts in Business and Economics Effective Entrepreneurial Management, 2016, 17-32. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-50467-4_2. Mller, Susan. "Business Models in Social Entrepreneurship." Social Entrepreneurship and Social Business, 2012, 105-31. doi:10.1007/978-3-8349-7093-0_6. Rusnjak, Andreas. "Entrepreneurial Business Modeling." Entrepreneurial Business Modeling, 2014, 81-108. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-03767-3_3. Rusnjak, Andreas. "Framework: Business Model-Poster." Entrepreneurial Business Modeling, 2014, 127-45. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-03767-3_5. Vaihekoski, M. "Book review: Entrepreneurial finance: Concepts and cases." International Small Business Journal 34, no. 6 (2016): 891-92. doi:10.1177/0266242616643881.

Thursday, April 16, 2020

The butterfly effect Essay Example For Students

The butterfly effect Essay This is alike of the genre as horror really likes to make obvious who are the victims and who are the villains of the text but as I said no clear narrative theory is used apart from Strauss where the clear different endings show different oppositions. The end shot is panned across in the dolly very slowly to really see the shot and the tension of the sequence and the horror of what they have done depending how far they are in the sequence each one just as tragic. This is challenging as they are really seen as children rather than teens and depicted as innocent but they are seen as dangerous but somehow still holds a sympathetic approach to especially the character of Evan and not to the character of Tommy. Tommy is very aggressive to realise this no mumbles even need to be heard the actors reactions show their opposition to him that he is the tough guy as even the older teens are beaten by him connoting Evan with no hope. We will write a custom essay on The butterfly effect specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now The dreamy sequences are seen highly with saturated colours, to show how Evan really doesnt believe it as it is a diffusion with softened skin to really make the actors look perfect using softer camera lens Kaylee stands up to father as Evan scared him after suicide story and the language of fuck bag gives an impression that he is not a child but is the older guy talking in a childlike form. Amy is therefore creating a stronger character here and is superficial they are all part of an in crowd opposed to before this is more than Evan wanted connoting a non realistic scene. Horror is usually shown with dark settings and isolated settings this is the opposite of this the only scene which really shows this is the scene in the basement where the only lights shown are candles lit, and the flash on the digital camera, it really enhances being isolated by being set on a lower level and to show him as perverted man with nowhere for innocent children to run from him. Kaylee becomes a prostitute and in another sequence working in a diner clearly due to her tormented past connoted as lonely and depressed used with medium shots and occasional close ups as she is not as pretty in these shots we as an audience may feel threatened an audience. A horror may do this but it did not fit in to the circumstances laid before us. Tommy however from a young age is seen as evil by the way he twists the doll in the basement following his fathers tactics. The real horror of the film is not the picture as such it is more the psychological concepts and realisations behind the film to realise how dangerous and haunting it can be when you change something which you will regret. None of the settings were that extreme there were few settings used and those which were are typical settings such as houses, university, school and the street the only tricky setting was the prison which was cast in a real set to show the toughness of real prisoners this scene really creates the fear and sensitivities of Evan and the horror of ending up in a place like this which after all the damage is done it is where he belongs but the high angles allows us to sympathises with him instead. The audience we expect would be those who are keen on the horror genre and they like to be scared so the film does what it can to be unpredictable not meeting the expectations of the audience but ending with the correct meaning which does meet this. It may also interest those interested in Psychology interested how ones memory works, the majority of the audience will be a of teens so a clear storyline needs to be built up to not be too complex and as it is a global text it needs to create ideological concepts that apply to all regions. .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 , .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .postImageUrl , .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .centered-text-area { min-height: 80px; position: relative; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 , .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:hover , .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:visited , .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:active { border:0!important; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .clearfix:after { content: ""; display: table; clear: both; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 { display: block; transition: background-color 250ms; webkit-transition: background-color 250ms; width: 100%; opacity: 1; transition: opacity 250ms; webkit-transition: opacity 250ms; background-color: #95A5A6; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:active , .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:hover { opacity: 1; transition: opacity 250ms; webkit-transition: opacity 250ms; background-color: #2C3E50; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .centered-text-area { width: 100%; position: relative ; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .ctaText { border-bottom: 0 solid #fff; color: #2980B9; font-size: 16px; font-weight: bold; margin: 0; padding: 0; text-decoration: underline; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .postTitle { color: #FFFFFF; font-size: 16px; font-weight: 600; margin: 0; padding: 0; width: 100%; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .ctaButton { background-color: #7F8C8D!important; color: #2980B9; border: none; border-radius: 3px; box-shadow: none; font-size: 14px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 26px; moz-border-radius: 3px; text-align: center; text-decoration: none; text-shadow: none; width: 80px; min-height: 80px; background: url(https://artscolumbia.org/wp-content/plugins/intelly-related-posts/assets/images/simple-arrow.png)no-repeat; position: absolute; right: 0; top: 0; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:hover .ctaButton { background-color: #34495E!important; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .centered-text { display: table; height: 80px; padding-left : 18px; top: 0; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8 .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8-content { display: table-cell; margin: 0; padding: 0; padding-right: 108px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle; width: 100%; } .u825a925152ca68538afb7522b9c650c8:after { content: ""; display: block; clear: both; } READ: Inequality in the Film Idustry EssaySo this is how they had the main theme of the relationship between Kaylee and Evan as everyone can relate to having a crush that never went the way they wanted it to go and hung up on the depression of this concept it is unpredictable in the way it is not a happy ending but fits in with the genre which is one of meaning. None of the tragedies outlined are serious in itself at the tender age of 7 in comparison to what they turn into as he grows older. A child seen drawing pictures and playing with knifes are seen as nothing serious and is a sense of exploring unless they are repeated it is feared and shocking of him as he is beyond this stage close ups of him allow us to really focus and become apart of his life and decide why he does the things he does. As more disasters happen at the age of 13 it starts to become worrying and the tension really connotes the shock of how this teen has developed his blackouts and not got rid of them the music really helps this with long sustained notes on the strings and emotional piano playing to highlight the moment and dramatise it creating tension. Non-surprisingly at the age of 20 it becomes beyond the limits with real crimes such as murders and being put into mental institutions. The aspects of horror are highlighting the real moments in a supernatural aspect of playing god they are not typical conventions of many horrors it is in a typical setting it does not scare the characters it plays on their vulnerabilities and the setting throughout the film does not change when re invented. The representations are also very typical. In his university years he is rather down to earth simple clothes and room opposed to the gothic character who he shares his flat with shown as completely contrasted not attractive and extreme in his clothing. Typical getting drunk and having sex environment an advance on the teens smoking and blowing up dynamites rebelliously who are shown as unattractive at this age could be connoting that they are investigating serious encounters and nothing will change if they dont improve this in keeping with the horror going where you shouldnt. The fading of the person before the location is moved in to a new scene really creates the horror like Evan doesnt exist and has risen from the dead.

Friday, March 13, 2020

australias economy essays

australias economy essays By 1939 France and Great Britain had declared war on Germany. Germany had invaded Poland and was working towards European domination while on the other side of the globe Japan had launched a massive attack on China and Korea and was steadily moving over the Pacific in an attempt to gain complete control over Greater East Asia. Italy was attempting to conquer the Mediterranean and was, thus far, triumphant. All was being broadcast globally on the radio. This was becoming a war unlike any in the 20th century, even the First World War couldnt compare to this gruesome fight against fascism, communism and world domination. For the first time ever there was a war on nearly every continent and ocean as well as every head and heart. This essay will examine how the media, economic and militaristic mobilization as well as the ideological opinions contribute to the view of the world being engrossed in what has now been called "the last noble war". This war characterized itself by the complete mobilization of man and his resources. Governments are soliciting the public for money: raising taxes, requesting the buying of war bonds, using every reserve they have including colonies, for soldiers and textiles, for example: coal, steel etc? Also there are strategic bombings of large cities, for the first time civilians fall victim, in great numbers, to the destruction of war. 50,000,000 people died in WWII, approximately 17,000,000 were civilians. With the help of the Nazis the term "genocide" was defined in this war. No genocidal attempt had ever achieved the same amount of success as Hitlers racial cleansing. This along with Communist Russia only fueled the war time propaganda. "Lebensraum", "La Grande Croisade, L?ion des Volontaires Fran?is contre le Bolchevisme", "Battle of Germany-Join an Air Crew". All of these are slogans or captions of posters propagandizing the war effort on the home fronts. Radios all over the world were broadcas...

Tuesday, February 25, 2020

The Killer Angles Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

The Killer Angles - Essay Example She was from the South, with family roots going back to Thomas Jefferson and "Light-Horse Harry" Lee. The diversity in his parents brought him in touch with both worlds, North and South, a factor that probably allowed him to understand both sides in the Civil War. Shaara did extremely well in school, winning more awards in high school than any other student in the history of the school. He received letters for basketball and track and excelled as a baseball pitcher. His father also taught him to box, something that remained a passion in his life and figured in his writing. Important books written by Michael Sharaa include; the killer Angels ,For Love of The Game, The Herald, The Broken place, Soldier Boy, The Noah conspiracy, ,Gods and Generals, Conquest Over Time and THE Book (Biblio.com) The killer angel is a famous book by Michael Shaara. It is a historical novel written in 1974, which won famous prize for fiction in 1975. Novel is about four days of the battle of Gettysburg in th e American civil war. Book starts from 29 June 1863 to 3 July. During this time, Union and Confederacy troops moved and fought in the battlefield. The novel is character driven where many of them talk and openly give their viewpoint. A film basing on novel was also released in 1993, named as Gettysburg. Tone of novel is sad covering era of 19th century. Mainly main gender is covered in the character of infantry soldier with white race. A significant amount of violence has been used. Main characters and adversaries are sensitive to others feelings. Sense of humor is displayed but gently. Setting used is USA with area of northeast- mid Atlantic states with small town. Michael Sharaa writes in preface ( Michael Sharaa) â€Å"This is the story of the Battle of Gettysburg, told from the viewpoints of Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet and some of the other men who fought there. Stephen Crane once said that he wrote The Red Badge of Courage because reading the cold history was not enough ; he wanted to know what it was like to be there, what the weather was like, what men's faces looked like. In order to live it he had to write it. This book was written for much the same reason. You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle and that war. I have therefore avoided historical opinions and gone back primarily to the words of the men themselves, their letters and other documents. I have not consciously changed any fact. I have condensed some of the action, for the sake of clarity, and eliminated some minor characters, for brevity; but though I have often had to choose between conflicting viewpoints, I have not knowingly violated the action. I have changed some of the language. It was a naive and sentimental time, and men spoke in windy phrases. I thought it necessary to update some of the words so that the religiosity and naivetZ of the time, which were genuine, would not seem too quaint to the modern e ar. I hope I will be forgiven that. The interpretation of character is my own†. There are following characters appearing through out the book South Robert Edward Lee (Commanding general, Army of Northern Virginia) James Longstreet (Lieutenant General) George Pickett (Major General) Lewis Addison Armistead (Brigadier General) John Bell Hood (Major General) Isaac

Sunday, February 9, 2020

The implications of the Intended Audience in Jewish Museaums Essay

The implications of the Intended Audience in Jewish Museaums - Essay Example This is the case with the two museums chosen for this report: The Beth Tzedec Reuben and Helen Dennis Museum and the Holocaust Centre of Toronto. The Beth Tzedecs Museum is important because it holds information for "all things Jewish" and The Holocaust Centre of Toronto is important because they educate the community about the Holocaust. The Beth Tzedecs Museum opened its doors in 1965 with the acquisition of Dr. Cecil Roths extensive Judaica collection. Dr. Roth was a prominent Jewish historian and his full collection contained over a thousand artifacts. Some were ceremonial objects, rare Esther scrolls, Chanukah lamps and more. Since their beginning they have acquired 1,800 artifacts that represent "Jewish art and history from ancient times to the present." (Beth Tzedec Website). This museum is housed inside a synagogue and it is open to the public. The museum is located in an old conservative synagogue in the Lawrence neighborhood in Toronto. The museums purpose is to be one component of the entire synagogue so that people can browse and learn about Jewish history. The museum and synagogue seem to be very welcoming to anyone who wants to learn about Judaica. Gopnik would call this museum a mausoleum type because it is "a place where you go to see old things and where you go to find yourself" (32). It is a reposit ory of ancient and current artifacts that are maintained for the world to see and talk about. This museum is small and it seems to be a small part of the synagogue and it is a small museum compared to The Holocaust Centre of Toronto and it does not seem to be of primary importance. The synagogue is a place for anyone to come and they seem to encourage people to explore them through videos, joining one of the many "shuls" or reading many of their materials. The audience seems to be anyone who would be

Thursday, January 30, 2020

Valentine’s Day Essay Example for Free

Valentine’s Day Essay Valentine day to me is a day full of love. It doesn’t matter if you don’t have a partner to share it with ,there people in your life that LOVE you like your mom, dad , brother , sister , uncle, aunt ,friends you have someone that LOVE you. And people you LOVE , we all live busy life forget sometime to really show someone or some people that you truly love them not because you don’t want to, its just life can go by so fast it good to have at least one day to stop think spread LOVE. You don’t have to buy anything special flower , candy , teddy bear etc using your voice to say a simply i LOVE you how much you are thankful to have them in your life there LOVE. Flowers always die , Candy gets eaten , teddy bear soon get in the way are thrown away but the words you said are remember kept in mind. Words are so powerful. So don’t stress on getting the perfect gift if you truly love this person they love you just as much all you need is each other , don’t stress if you don’t have a valentine or a boyfriend or girlfriend you could celebrate this day of LOVE with just about anyone you LOVE. The common saying is why don’t you show this person LOVE everyday why it has to be on valentine day , i understand that you should do that well at least make sure you say i love you cause you never know if that be the last time you could, were only human and tend to forget things get over whelm with LIFE. I am sure you forget to show people how much you love them to the fullest everyday.

Wednesday, January 22, 2020

Shooting an Elephant :: essays research papers

A police officer in the British Raj, the supposedly 'unbreakable'; ruling force, was afraid. With his gun aimed at a elephant's head, he was faced with the decision to pull the trigger. That officer was George Orwell, and he writes about his experience in his short story, 'Shooting an Elephant';. To save face, he shrugged it off as his desire to 'avoid looking the fool'; (George Orwell, 283). In truth, the atmosphere of fear and pressure overwhelmed him. His inner struggle over the guilt of being involved in the subjugation of a people added to this strain, and he made a decision he would later regret enough to write this story. Early on in his essay, Orwell describes how the abuses and treatment he witnessed oppressed him '… with an intolerable sense of guilt,'; (Orwell,277). This is not some minor pang, or nagging worry. The shame pressed down on his shoulders with an unbearable weight. He also describes the injustices in detail, using vivid pictures like 'The wretched prisoners huddling in the stinking cages…'; (Orwell,277). This does not come from someone who condones such behavior. It stems from a troubled, remorseful soul. The mob, thousands by his description, also pressured him. 'I could feel their two-thousand wills pressing me forward, irresistibly,'; he emphasizes (Orwell, 280). It is hard to resist the peer pressure of one or two people, much less a crowd of thousands. He admits, '…in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the faces behind.'; Thus, the desire and will of the crowd urge him on, ominously. The people despised him. He speaks of being 'hated by large numbers of people'; and the 'sneering yellow faces of young men that met me everywhere..." (Orwell, 276). As one man, how could he dare to go against them? Two thousand could easily overtake one. They would not have aided him, should anything go wrong, and eagerly anticipated that eventuality. He describes his fear that they would watch him be '…pursued, caught, trampled on, and reduced to a grinning corpse…'; should the elephant charge (Orwell, 281).

Monday, January 13, 2020

Role of Computer in Daily Life

Financial Crises and Bank Liquidity Creation Allen N. Berger †  and Christa H. S. Bouwman †¡ October 2008 Financial crises and bank liquidity creation are often connected. We examine this connection from two perspectives. First, we examine the aggregate liquidity creation of banks before, during, and after five major financial crises in the U. S. from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q1. We uncover numerous interesting patterns, such as a significant build-up or drop-off of â€Å"abnormal† liquidity creation before each crisis, where â€Å"abnormal† is defined relative to a time trend and seasonal factors.Banking and market-related crises differ in that banking crises were preceded by abnormal positive liquidity creation, while market-related crises were generally preceded by abnormal negative liquidity creation. Bank liquidity creation has both decreased and increased during crises, likely both exacerbating and ameliorating the effects of crises. Off-balance sheet guarantees such as loan commitments moved more than on-balance sheet assets such as mortgages and business lending during banking crises.Second, we examine the effect of pre-crisis bank capital ratios on the competitive positions and profitability of individual banks during and after each crisis. The evidence suggests that high capital served large banks well around banking crises – they improved their liquidity creation market share and profitability during these crises and were able to hold on to their improved performance afterwards. In addition, high-capital listed banks enjoyed significantly higher abnormal stock returns than low-capital listed banks during banking crises.These benefits did not hold or held to a lesser degree around marketrelated crises and in normal times. In contrast, high capital ratios appear to have helped small banks improve their liquidity creation market share during banking crises, market-related crises, and normal times alike, and the gains in market shar e were sustained afterwards. Their profitability improved during two crises and subsequent to virtually every crisis. Similar results were observed during normal times for small banks. †  University of South Carolina, Wharton Financial Institutions Center, and CentER – Tilburg University.Contact details: Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, 1705 College Street, Columbia, SC 29208. Tel: 803-576-8440. Fax: 803-777-6876. E-mail: [email  protected] sc. edu. †¡ Case Western Reserve University, and Wharton Financial Institutions Center. Contact details: Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, 362 PBL, Cleveland, OH 44106. Tel. : 216-368-3688. Fax: 216-368-6249. E-mail: christa. [email  protected] edu. Keywords: Financial Crises, Liquidity Creation, and Banking. JEL Classification: G28, and G21.The authors thank Asani Sarkar, Bob DeYoung, Peter Ritchken, Greg Udell, and participants at presentations at the Summer Research Conference 2008 in Finance at the ISB in Hyderabad, the International Monetary Fund, the University of Kansas’ Southwind Finance Conference, and Erasmus University for useful comments. Financial Crises and Bank Liquidity Creation 1. Introduction Over the past quarter century, the U. S. has experienced a number of financial crises. At the heart of these crises are often issues surrounding liquidity provision by the banking sector and financial markets (e. . , Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2007). For example, in the current subprime lending crisis, liquidity seems to have dried up as banks seem less willing to lend to individuals, firms, other banks, and capital market participants, and loan securitization appears to be significantly depressed. This behavior of banks is summarized by the Economist: â€Å"Although bankers are always stingier in a downturn, [†¦] lots of banks said they had also cut back lending because of a slide in their current or expe cted capital and liquidity. 1 The practical importance of liquidity during crises is buttressed by financial intermediation theory, which indicates that the creation of liquidity is an important reason why banks exist. 2 Early contributions argue that banks create liquidity by financing relatively illiquid assets such as business loans with relatively liquid liabilities such as transactions deposits (e. g. , Bryant 1980, Diamond and Dybvig 1983). More recent contributions suggest that banks also create liquidity off the balance sheet through loan commitments and similar claims to liquid funds (e. g. Holmstrom and Tirole 1998, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002). 3 The creation of liquidity makes banks fragile and susceptible to runs (e. g. , Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Chari and Jagannathan 1988), and such runs can lead to crises via contagion effects. Bank liquidity creation can also have real effects, in particular if a financial crisis ruptures the creation of liquidity (e. g. , Dellâ⠂¬â„¢Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 2008). 4 Exploring the relationship between financial crises and bank liquidity creation can thus yield potentially interesting economic insights and may have important policy implications.The goals of this paper are twofold. The first is to examine the aggregate liquidity creation of 1 â€Å"The credit crisis: Financial engine failure† – The Economist, February 7, 2008. According to the theory, another central role of banks in the economy is to transform credit risk (e. g. , Diamond 1984, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986). Recently, Coval and Thakor (2005) theorize that banks may also arise in response to the behavior of irrational agents in financial markets. 3James (1981) and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) endogenize the loan commitment contract due to informational frictions. The loan commitment contract is subsequently used in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) to show how banks can provide liquidity to borrowers. 4 Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that liquidity risk also affects the expected returns on stocks. 2 1 banks around five financial crises in the U. S. over the past quarter century. 5 The crises include two banking crises (the credit crunch of the early 1990s and the subprime lending crisis of 2007 – ? and three crises that can be viewed as primarily market-related (the 1987 stock market crash, the Russian debt crisis plus the Long-Term Capital Management meltdown in 1998, and the bursting of the dot. com bubble plus the September 11 terrorist attack of the early 2000s). This examination is intended to shed light on whether there are any connections between financial crises and aggregate liquidity creation, and whether these vary based on the nature of the crisis (i. e. , banking versus market-related crisis). A good nderstanding of the behavior of bank liquidity creation around financial crises is also important to shed light on whether banks create â€Å"too little† or â€Å"too much† liquidity, and whether bank behavior exacerbates or ameliorates the effects of crises. We document the empirical regularities related to these issues, so as to raise additional interesting questions for further empirical and theoretical examinations. The second goal is to study the effect of pre-crisis equity capital ratios on the competitive positions and profitability of individual banks around each crisis.Since bank capital affects liquidity creation (e. g. , Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001, Berger and Bouwman forthcoming), it is likely that banks with different capital ratios behave differently during crises in terms of their liquidity creation responses. Specifically, we ask: are high-capital banks able to gain market share in terms of liquidity creation at the expense of low-capital banks during a crisis, and does such enhanced market share translate into higher profitability? If so, are the high-capital banks able t o sustain their improved competitive positions after the financial crisis is over?The recent acquisitions of Countrywide, Bear Stearns, and Washington Mutual provide interesting case studies in this regard. All three firms ran low on capital and had to be bailed out by banks with stronger capital positions. Bank of America (Countrywide’s acquirer) and J. P. Morgan Chase (acquirer of Bear-Stearns and Washington Mutual’s banking operations) had capital ratios high enough to enable them to buy their rivals at a small fraction of what they were worth a year before, thereby gaining a potential competitive advantage. 6 The recent experience of IndyMac Bank provides 5Studies on the behavior of banks around financial crises have typically focused on commercial and real estate lending (e. g. , Berger and Udell 1994, Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2008). We focus on the more comprehensive notion of bank liquidity creation. 6 On Sunday, Mar ch 16, 2008, J. P. Morgan Chase agreed to pay $2 a share to buy all of Bear Stearns, less than onetenth of the firm’s share price on Friday and a small fraction of the $170 share price a year before. On March 24, 2008, it increased its bid to $10, and completed the transaction on May 30, 2008.On January 11, Bank of America announced it would pay $4 billion for Countrywide, after Countrywide’s market capitalization had plummeted 85% during the preceding 12 months. The transaction was completed on July 1, 2008. After a $16. 4 billion ten-day bank 2 another interesting example. The FDIC seized IndyMac Bank after it suffered substantive losses and depositors had started to run on the bank. The FDIC intends to sell the bank, preferably as a single entity but if that does not work, the bank will be sold off in pieces.Given the way the regulatory approval process for bank acquisitions works, it is likely that the acquirer(s) will have a strong capital base. 7 A financial cris is is a natural event to examine how capital affects the competitive positions of banks. During â€Å"normal† times, capital has many effects on the bank, some of which counteract each other, making it difficult to learn much. For example, capital helps the bank cope more effectively with risk,8 but it also reduces the value of the deposit insurance put option (Merton 1977). During a crisis, risks become elevated and the risk-absorption capacity of capital becomes paramount.Banks with high capital, which are better buffered against the shocks of the crisis, may thus gain a potential advantage. To examine the behavior of bank liquidity creation around financial crises, we calculate the amount of liquidity created by the banking sector using Berger and Bouwman’s (forthcoming) preferred liquidity creation measure. This measure takes into account the fact that banks create liquidity both on and off the balance sheet and is constructed using a three-step procedure. In the f irst step, all bank assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet activities are classified as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid.This is done based on the ease, cost, and time for customers to obtain liquid funds from the bank, and the ease, cost, and time for banks to dispose of their obligations in order to meet these liquidity demands. This classification process uses information on both product category and maturity for all activities other than loans; due to data limitations, loans are classified based solely on category (â€Å"cat†). Thus, residential mortgages are classified as more liquid than business loans regardless of maturity because it is generally easier to securitize and sell such mortgages than business loans.In the second step, weights are assigned to these activities. The weights are consistent with the theory in that maximum liquidity is created when illiquid assets (e. g. , business loans) are transformed into liquid liabilities (e. g. , transactions deposits) and maximum liquidity is destroyed when liquid assets (e. g. , treasuries) are transformed into illiquid liabilities â€Å"walk†, Washington Mutual was placed into the receivership of the FDIC on September 25, 2008. J. P. Morgan Chase purchased the banking business for $1. 9 billion and re-opened the bank the next day.On September 26, 2008, the holding company and its remaining subsidiary filed for bankruptcy. Washington Mutual, the sixth-largest bank in the U. S. before its collapse, is the largest bank failure in the U. S. financial history. 7 After peaking at $50. 11 on May 8, 2006, IndyMac’s shares lost 87% of their value in 2007 and another 95% in 2008. Its share price closed at $0. 28 on July 11, 2008, the day before it was seized by the FDIC. 8 There are numerous papers that argue that capital enhances the risk-absorption capacity of banks (e. g. , Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, Repullo 2004, Von Thadden 2004). (e. g. , subordinated debt) or equity. In the third step, a â€Å"cat fat† liquidity creation measure is constructed, where â€Å"fat† refers to the inclusion of off-balance sheet activities. Although Berger and Bouwman construct four different liquidity creation measures, they indicate that â€Å"cat fat† is the preferred measure. They argue that to assess the amount of liquidity creation, the ability to securitize or sell a particular loan category is more important than the maturity of those loans, and the inclusion of off-balance sheet activities is critical. We apply the â€Å"cat fat† liquidity creation measure to quarterly data on virtually all U. S. commercial and credit card banks from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q1. Our measurement of aggregate liquidity creation by banks allows us to examine the behavior of liquidity created prior to, during, and after each crisis. The popular press has provided anecdotal accounts of liquidity drying up during some financial crises as well as excessive liquidity p rovision at other times that led to credit expansion bubbles (e. g. , the subprime lending crisis).We attempt to give empirical content to these notions of â€Å"too little† and â€Å"too much† liquidity created by banks. Liquidity creation has quadrupled in real terms over the sample period and appears to have seasonal components (as documented below). Since no theories exist that explain the intertemporal behavior of liquidity creation, we take an essentially empirical approach to the problem and focus on how far liquidity creation lies above or below a time trend and seasonal factors. 10 That is, we focus on â€Å"abnormal† liquidity creation.The use of this measure rests on the supposition that some â€Å"normal† amount of liquidity creation exists, acknowledging that at any point in time, liquidity creation may be â€Å"too much† or â€Å"too little† in dollar terms. Our main results regarding the behavior of liquidity creation around f inancial crises are as follows. First, prior to financial crises, there seems to have been a significant build-up or drop-off of â€Å"abnormal† liquidity creation. Second, banking and market-related crises differ in two respects.The banking crises (the credit crunch of 1990-1992 and the current subprime lending crisis) were preceded by abnormal positive liquidity creation by banks, whereas the market-related crises were generally preceded by abnormal negative liquidity creation. In addition, the banking crises themselves seemed to change the trajectory of aggregate liquidity creation, while the market-related crises did not appear to do so. Third, 9 Their alternative measures include â€Å"cat nonfat,† â€Å"mat fat,† and â€Å"mat nonfat. † The â€Å"nonfat† measures exclude offbalance sheet activities, and the â€Å"mat† measures classify loans by maturity rather than by product category. 0 As alternative approaches, we use the dollar amo unt of liquidity creation per capita and liquidity creation divided by GDP and obtain similar results (see Section 4. 2). 4 liquidity creation has both decreased during crises (e. g. , the 1990-1992 credit crunch) and increased during crises (e. g. , the 1998 Russian debt crisis / LTCM bailout). Thus, liquidity creation likely both exacerbated and ameliorated the effects of crises. Fourth, off-balance sheet illiquid guarantees (primarily loan commitments) moved more than semi-liquid assets (primarily mortgages) and illiquid assets (primarily business loans) during banking crises.Fifth, the current subprime lending crisis was preceded by an unusually high positive abnormal amount of aggregate liquidity creation, possibly caused by lax lending standards that led banks to extend increasing amounts of credit and off-balance sheet guarantees. This suggests a possible dark side of bank liquidity creation. While financial fragility may be needed to induce banks to create liquidity (e. g. , Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001), our analysis raises the intriguing possibility that the causality may also be reversed in the sense that too much liquidity creation may lead to financial fragility.We then turn to the second goal of the paper – examining whether banks’ pre-crisis capital ratios affect their competitive positions and profitability around financial crises. To examine the effect on a bank’s competitive position, we regress the change in its market share of liquidity creation – measured as the average market share of aggregate liquidity creation during the crisis (or over the eight quarters after the crisis) minus the average market share over the eight quarters before the crisis, expressed as a proportion of the bank’s average pre-crisis market share – on its average pre-crisis capital ratio and a set of control variables. 1 Since the analyses in the first half of the paper reveal a great deal of heterogeneity in crises, we run these regressions on a per-crisis basis, rather than pooling the data across crises. The control variables include bank size, bank risk, bank holding company membership, local market competition,12 and proxies for the economic circumstances in the local markets in which the bank operates. Moreover, we examine large and small banks as two separate groups since the results in Berger and Bouwman (forthcoming) indicate that the effect of capital on liquidity creation differs across large and small banks. 13 11Defining market share this way is a departure from previous research (e. g. , Laeven and Levine 2007), in which market share relates to the bank’s weighted-average local market share of total deposits. 12 While our focus is on the change in banks’ competitive positions measured in terms of their aggregate liquidity creation market shares, we control for â€Å"local market competition† measured as the bank-level Herfindahl index based on local market deposit mar ket shares. 13 Berger and Bouwman use three size categories: large, medium, and small banks. We combine the large and medium bank categories into one â€Å"large bank† category. 5One potential concern is that differences in bank capital ratios may simply reflect differences in bank risk. Banks that hold higher capital ratios because their investment portfolios are riskier may not improve their competitive positions around financial crises. Our empirical design takes this into account. The inclusion of bank risk as a control variable is critical and ensures that the measured effect of capital on a bank’s market share is net of the effect of risk. We find evidence that high-capital large banks improved their market share of liquidity creation during the two banking crises, but not during the market-related crises.After the credit crunch of the early 1990s, high-capital large banks held on to their improved competitive positions. Since the current subprime lending crisis was not over at the end of the sample period, we cannot yet tell whether highcapital large banks will also hold on to their improved competitive positions after this crisis. In contrast to the large banks, high-capital small banks seemed to enhance their competitive positions during all crises and held on to their improved competitive positions after the crises as well.Next, we focus on the effect of pre-crisis bank capital on the profitability of the bank around each crisis. We run regressions that are similar to the ones described above with the change in return on equity (ROE) as the dependent variable. We find that high-capital large banks improved their ROE in those cases in which they enhanced their liquidity creation market share – the two banking crises – and were able to hold on to their improved profitability after the credit crunch. profitability after the market-related crises. They also increased theirIn contrast, for high-capital small banks, profitabilit y improved during two crises, and subsequent to virtually every crisis. As an additional analysis, we examine whether the improved competitive positions and profitability of high-capital banks translated into better stock return performance. To perform this analysis, we focus on listed banks and bank holding companies (BHCs). If multiple banks are part of the same listed BHC, their financial statements are added together to create pro-forma financial statements of the BHC.The results confirm the earlier change in performance findings of large banks: listed banks with high capital ratios enjoyed significantly larger abnormal returns than banks with low capital ratios during banking crises, but not during market-related crises. Our results are based on a five-factor asset pricing model that includes the three Fama-French (1993) factors, momentum, and a proxy for the slope of the yield curve. 6 We also check whether high capital provided similar advantages outside crisis periods, i. e. , during â€Å"normal† times.We find that large banks with high capital ratios did not enjoy either market share or profitability gains over the other large banks, whereas for small banks, results are similar to the smallbank findings discussed above. Moreover, outside banking crises, high capital was not associated with high stock returns. Combined, the results suggest that high capital ratios serve large banks well, particularly around banking crises. In contrast, high capital ratios appear to help small banks around banking crises, marketrelated crises, and normal times alike. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 explains the liquidity creation measures and our sample based on data of U. S. banks from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q1. Section 4 describes the behavior of aggregate bank liquidity creation around five financial crises and draws some general conclusions. Section 5 discusses the tests of the effects of pre crisis capital ratios on banks’ competitive positions and profitability around financial crises and â€Å"normal† times. This section also examines the stock returns of high- and low-capital listed banking organizations during each crisis and during normal† times. Section 6 concludes. 2. Related literature This paper is related to two literatures. The first is the literature on financial crises. 14 One strand in this literature has focused on financial crises and fragility. Some papers have analyzed contagion. Contributions in this area suggest that a small liquidity shock in one area may have a contagious effect throughout the economy (e. g. , Allen and Gale 1998, 2000). Other papers have focused on the determinants of financial crises and the policy implications (e. g. Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria 2001, Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta 2006, Lorenzoni 2008, Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven forthcoming). A second strand examines the e ffect of financial crises on the real sector (e. g. , Friedman and Schwarz 1963, Bernanke 1983, Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 2008, Shin forthcoming). These papers find that financial crises increase the cost of financing and reduce credit, which adversely affects corporate investment and may lead to reduced 14Allen and Gale (2007) provide a detailed overview of the causes and consequences of financial crises. 7 growth and recessions. That is, financial crises have independent real effects (see Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 2008). In contrast to these papers, we examine how the amount of liquidity created by the banking sector behaved around financial crises in the U. S. , and explore systematic patterns in the data. The second literature to which this paper is related focuses on the strategic use of leverage in product-market competition for non-financial firms (e. g. , Brander and Lewis 1986, Campello 2006, Lyandres 2006).This literature suggests that financial leverage can affect competitive dynamics. While this literature has not focused on banks, we analyze the effects of crises on the competitive positioning and profitability of banks based on their pre-crisis capital ratios. Our hypothesis is that in the case of banks, the competitive implications of capital are likely to be most pronounced during a crisis when a bank’s capitalization has a major influence on its ability to survive the crisis, particularly in light of regulatory discretion in closing banks or otherwise resolving problem institutions.Liquidity creation may be a channel through which this competitive advantage is gained or lost. 15 3. Description of the liquidity creation measure and sample We calculate the dollar amount of liquidity created by the banking sector using Berger and Bouwman’s (forthcoming) preferred â€Å"cat fat† liquidity creation measure. In this section, we explain briefly what this acronym stand s for and how we construct this measure. 16 We then describe our sample. All financial values are expressed in real 2007:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. 3. 1. Liquidity creation measureTo construct a measure of liquidity creation, we follow Berger and Bouwman’s three-step procedure (see Table 1). Below, we briefly discuss these three steps. In Step 1, we classify all bank activities (assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet activities) as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid. For assets, we do this based on the ease, cost, and time for banks to dispose of their obligations in order to meet these liquidity demands. For liabilities and equity, we do this 15 Allen and Gale (2004) analyze how competition affects financial stability. We reverse the causality and examine the effect of financial crises on competition. 6 For a more detailed discussion, see Berger and Bouwman (forthcoming). 8 based on the ease, cost, and time for customers to obtain liquid fund s from the bank. We follow a similar approach for off-balance sheet activities, classifying them based on functionally similar on-balance sheet activities. For all activities other than loans, this classification process uses information on both product category and maturity. Due to data restrictions, we classify loans entirely by category (â€Å"cat†). 17 In Step 2, we assign weights to all the bank activities classified in Step 1.The weights are consistent with liquidity creation theory, which argues that banks create liquidity on the balance sheet when they transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. We therefore apply positive weights to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities. Following similar logic, we apply negative weights to liquid assets and illiquid liabilities and equity, since banks destroy liquidity when they use illiquid liabilities to finance liquid assets. We use weights of ? and -? , because only half of the total amount of liquidity created is attrib utable to the source or use of funds alone.For example, when $1 of liquid liabilities is used to finance $1 in illiquid assets, liquidity creation equals ? * $1 + ? * $1 = $1. In this case, maximum liquidity is created. However, when $1 of liquid liabilities is used to finance $1 in liquid assets, liquidity creation equals ? * $1 + -? * $1 = $0. In this case, no liquidity is created as the bank holds items of approximately the same liquidity as those it gives to the nonbank public. Maximum liquidity is destroyed when $1 of illiquid liabilities or equity is used to finance $1 of liquid assets. In this case, liquidity creation equals -? $1 + -? * $1 = -$1. An intermediate weight of 0 is applied to semi-liquid assets and liabilities. Weights for off-balance sheet activities are assigned using the same principles. In Step 3, we combine the activities as classified in Step 1 and as weighted in Step 2 to construct Berger and Bouwman’s preferred â€Å"cat fat† liquidity creat ion measure. This measure classifies loans by category (â€Å"cat†), while all activities other than loans are classified using information on product category and maturity, and includes off-balance sheet activities (â€Å"fat†).Berger and Bouwman construct four liquidity creation measures by alternatively classifying loans by category or maturity, and by alternatively including or excluding off-balance sheet activities. However, they argue that â€Å"cat fat† is the preferred measure since for liquidity creation, banks’ ability to securitize or sell loans is more important than loan maturity, and banks do create liquidity both on the balance sheet and off the balance sheet. 17 Alternatively, we could classify loans by maturity (â€Å"mat†).However, Berger and Bouwman argue that it is preferable to classify them by category since for loans, the ability to securitize or sell is more important than their maturity. 9 To obtain the dollar amount of liq uidity creation at a particular bank, we multiply the weights of ? , -? , or 0, respectively, times the dollar amounts of the corresponding bank activities and add the weighted dollar amounts. 3. 2. Sample description We include virtually all commercial and credit card banks in the U. S. in our study. 18 For each bank, we obtain quarterly Call Report data from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q1.We keep a bank if it: 1) has commercial real estate or commercial and industrial loans outstanding; 2) has deposits; 3) has an equity capital ratio of at least 1%; 4) has gross total assets or GTA (total assets plus allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve) exceeding $25 million. We end up with data on 18,134 distinct banks, yielding 907,159 bank-quarter observations over our sample period. For each bank, we calculate the dollar amount of liquidity creation using the process described in Section 3. 1.The amount of liquidity creation and all other financial values are put in to real 2007:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. When we explore aggregate bank liquidity creation around financial crises, we focus on the real dollar amount of liquidity creation by the banking sector. To obtain this, we aggregate the liquidity created by all banks in each quarter and end up with a sample that contains 97 inflation-adjusted, quarterly liquidity creation amounts. In contrast, when we examine how capital affects the competitive positions of banks, we focus on the amount of liquidity created by individual banks around each crisis.Given documented differences between large and small banks in terms of portfolio composition (e. g. , Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005) and the effect of capital on liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman forthcoming), we split the sample into large banks (between 330 and 477 observations, depending on the crisis) and small banks (between 5556 and 6343 observations, depending on the crisis), and run all change in market share and profitability regressions separately for these two sets of banks.Large banks have gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $1 billion at the end of the quarter before a crisis 18 Berger and Bouwman (forthcoming) include only commercial banks. We also include credit card banks to avoid an artificial $0. 19 trillion drop in bank liquidity creation in the fourth quarter of 2006 when Citibank N. A. moved its credit-card lines to Citibank South Dakota N. A. , a credit card bank. 10 and small banks have GTA up to $1 billion at the end of that quarter. 19,20 4.The behavior of aggregate bank liquidity creation around financial crises This section focuses on the first goal of the paper – examining the aggregate liquidity creation of banks across five financial crises in the U. S. over the past quarter century. The crises include the 1987 stock market crash, the credit crunch of the early 1990s, the Russian debt crisis plus Long-Term Capital M anagement (LTCM) bailout of 1998, the bursting of the dot. com bubble and the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks of the early 2000s, and the current subprime lending crisis. We first provide summary statistics and explain our empirical approach.We then discuss alternative measures of abnormal liquidity creation. Next, we describe the behavior of bank liquidity creation before, during, and after each crisis. Finally, we draw some general conclusions from these results. 4. 1. Summary statistics and empirical approach Figure 1 Panel A shows the dollar amount of liquidity created by the banking sector, calculated using the â€Å"cat fat† liquidity creation measure over our sample period. As shown, liquidity creation has increased substantially over time: it has more than quadrupled from $1. 369 trillion in 1984:Q1 to $5. 06 trillion in 2008:Q1 (in real 2007:Q4 dollars). We want to examine whether liquidity creation by the banking sector is â€Å"high,† â€Å"low,† or at a à ¢â‚¬Å"normal† level around financial crises. Since no theories exist that explain the intertemporal behavior of liquidity creation or generate numerical estimates of â€Å"normal† liquidity creation, we need a reasonable empirical approach. At first blush, it may seem that we could simply calculate the average amount of bank liquidity creation over the entire sample period and view amounts above this sample average as â€Å"high† and amounts below the average as â€Å"low. However, Figure 1 Panel A clearly shows that this approach would cause us to classify the entire second half of the sample period (1996:Q1 – 2008:Q1) as â€Å"high† and the entire first half of the sample period (1984:Q1 – 1995:Q4) as â€Å"low. † We therefore do not 19 As noted before, we combine Berger and Bouwman’s large and medium bank categories into one â€Å"large bank† category. Recall that all financial values are expressed in real 2007:Q4 dol lars. 20 GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve.Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value of the loans financed and the liquidity created by the bank on the asset side. 11 use this approach. The approach we take is aimed at calculating the â€Å"abnormal† amount of liquidity created by the banking sector based on a time trend. It focuses on whether liquidity creation lies above or below this time trend, and also deseasonalizes the data to ensure that we do not base our conclusions on mere seasonal effects.We detrend and deseasonalize the data by regressing the dollar amount of liquidity creation on a time index and three quarterly dummies. The residuals from this regression measure the â€Å"abnormal† dollar amount of liquidity creation in a particular quarter. That is, they measure how far (deseasonalized) liquidity creation lies above or below the trend line. If abnormal liquidity creation is greater than (smaller than) $0, the dollar amount of liquidity created by the banking sector lies above (below) the time trend.If abnormal liquidity creation is high (low) relative to the time trend and seasonal factors, we will interpret this as liquidity creation being â€Å"too high† (â€Å"too low†). Figure 1 Panel B shows abnormal liquidity creation over time. The amount of liquidity created by the banking sector was high (yet declining) in the mid-1980s, low in the mid-1990s, and high (and mostly rising) in the most recent years. 4. 2. Alternative measures of abnormal liquidity creation We considered several alternative approaches to measuring abnormal liquidity creation. One possibility is to scale the dollar amount of liquidity creation by total population.The idea behind this approach is that a â€Å"normal† amount of liquidity creation may exi st in per capita terms. The average amount of liquidity creation per capita over our sample period could potentially serve as the â€Å"normal† amount and deviations from this average would be viewed as abnormal. To calculate per capita liquidity creation we obtain annual U. S. population estimates from the U. S. Census Bureau. Figure 2 Panel A shows per capita liquidity creation over time. The picture reveals that per capita liquidity creation more than tripled from $5. 8K in 1984:Q1 to $18. 8K in 2008:Q1.Interestingly, the picture looks very similar to the one shown in Panel A, perhaps because the annual U. S. population growth rate is low. For reasons similar to those in our earlier analysis, we calculate abnormal per capita liquidity creation by detrending and deseasonalizing the data like we did in the previous section. Figure 2 Panel B shows abnormal per capita liquidity creation over time. 12 Another possibility is to scale the dollar amount of liquidity creation by GD P. Since liquidity creation by banks may causally affect GDP, this approach seems less appropriate.Nonetheless, we show the results for completeness. Figure 2 Panel C shows the dollar amount of liquidity creation divided by GDP. The picture reveals that bank liquidity creation has increased from 19. 9% of GDP in 1984:Q1 to 40. 4% of GDP in 2008:Q1. While liquidity creation more than quadrupled over the sample period, GDP doubled. Importantly, the picture looks similar to the one shown in Panel A. Again, for reasons similar to those in our earlier analysis, we detrend and deseasonalize the data to obtain abnormal liquidity creation divided by GDP.Figure 2 Panel D shows abnormal liquidity creation divided by GDP over time. Since these alternative approaches yield results that are similar to those shown in Section 4. 1, we focus our discussions on the abnormal amount of liquidity creation (rather than the abnormal amount of per capita liquidity creation or the abnormal amount of liquid ity creation divided by GDP) around financial crises. 4. 3. Abnormal bank liquidity creation before, during, and after five financial crises We now examine how abnormal bank liquidity creation behaved efore, during, and after five financial crises. In all cases, the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are defined to be eight quarters long. 21 The one exception is that we do not examine abnormal bank liquidity creation after the current subprime lending crisis, since this crisis was still ongoing at the end of the sample period. Figure 3 Panels A – E show the graphs of the abnormal amount of liquidity creation for the five crises. This subsection is a fact-finding effort and largely descriptive. In Section 4. , we will combine the evidence gathered here and interpret it to draw some general conclusions. Financial crisis #1: Stock market crash (1987:Q4) On Monday, October 19, 1987, the stock market crashed, with the S&P500 index falling about 20%. During the years before the cra sh, the level of the stock market had increased dramatically, causing some 21 As a result of our choice of two-year pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, the post-Russian debt crisis period overlaps with the bursting of the dot. com bubble, and the pre-dot. com bubble period overlaps with the Russian debt crisis.For these two crises, we redo our analyses using six-quarter pre-crisis and post-crisis periods and obtain results that are qualitatively similar to the ones documented here. 13 concern that the market had become overvalued. 22 A few days before the crash, two events occurred that may have helped precipitate the crash: 1) legislation was enacted to eliminate certain tax benefits associated with financing mergers; and 2) information was released that the trade deficit was above expectations. Both events seemed to have added to the selling pressure and a record trading volume on Oct. 9, in part caused by program trading, overwhelmed many systems. Figure 3 Panel A shows abnormal bank liquidity creation before, during, and after the stock market crash. Although this financial crisis seems to have originated in the stock market rather than the banking system, it is clear from the graph that abnormal liquidity creation by banks was high ($0. 5 trillion above the time trend) two years before the crisis. It had already dropped substantially before the crisis and continued to drop until well after the crisis, but was still above the time trend even a year after the crisis.Financial crisis #2: Credit crunch (1990:Q1 – 1992:Q4) During the first three years of the 1990s, bank commercial and industrial lending declined in real terms, particularly for small banks and for small loans (see Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995, Table 8, for details). The ascribed causes of the credit crunch include a fall in bank capital from the loan loss experiences of the late 1980s (e. g. , Peek and Rosengren 1995), the increases in bank leverage requirements and implementation o f Basel I risk-based capital standards during this time period (e. g. Berger and Udell 1994, Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995, Thakor 1996), an increase in supervisory toughness evidenced in worse examination ratings for a given bank condition (e. g. , Berger, Kyle, and Scalise 2001), and reduced loan demand because of macroeconomic and regional recessions (e. g. , Bernanke and Lown 1991). To some extent, the research supports virtually all of these hypotheses. Figure 3 Panel B shows how abnormal liquidity creation behaved before, during, and after the credit crunch. The graph shows that liquidity creation was above the time trend before the crisis, but declining.After a temporary increase, it dropped markedly during the crisis by roughly $0. 6 trillion, and the decline even extended a bit beyond the crunch period. After having reached a noticeably low level in the post-crunch period, liquidity creation slowly started to bottom out. This evidence suggests that the 22 E. g. , â€Å"R aging bull, stock market’s surge is puzzling investors: When will it end? † on page 1 of the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1987. 14 banking sector created (slightly) positive abnormal liquidity before the crisis, but created significantly negative abnormal liquidity during and fter the crisis, representing behavior by banks that may have further fueled the crisis. Financial crisis #3: Russian debt crisis / LTCM bailout (1998:Q3 – 1998:Q4) Since its inception in March 1994, hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (â€Å"LTCM†) followed an arbitrage strategy that was avowedly â€Å"market neutral,† designed to make money regardless of whether prices were rising or falling. When Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt on August 17, 1998, investors fled from other government paper to the safe haven of U. S. treasuries.This flight to liquidity caused an unexpected widening of spreads on supposedly low-risk portfolios. By the end of August 1998, LTCMâ€⠄¢s capital had dropped to $2. 3 billion, less than 50% of its December 1997 value, with assets standing at $126 billion. In the first three weeks of September, LTCM’s capital dropped further to $600 million without shrinking the portfolio. Banks began to doubt its ability to meet margin calls. To prevent a potential systemic meltdown triggered by the collapse of the world’s largest hedge fund, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a $3. billion bail-out by LTCM’s major creditors on September 23, 1998. In 1998:Q4, many large banks had to take substantial write-offs as a result of losses on their investments. Figure 3 Panel C shows abnormal liquidity creation around the Russian debt crisis and LTCM bailout. The pattern shown in the graph is very different from the ones we have seen so far. Liquidity creation was abnormally negative before the crisis, but increasing. Liquidity creation increased further during the crisis, countercyclical behavior by banks that may have alleviated the crisis, and continued to grow after the crisis.This suggests that liquidity creation may have been too low entering the crisis and returned to normal levels a few quarters after the end of the crisis. Financial crisis #4: Bursting of the dot. com bubble and Sept. 11 terrorist attack (2000:Q2 – 2002:Q3) The dot. com bubble was a speculative stock price bubble that was built up during the mid to late 1990s. During this period, many internet-based companies, commonly referred to as â€Å"dot. coms,† were founded. Rapidly increasing stock prices and widely available venture capital created an environment in which 15 any of these companies seemed to focus largely on increasing market share. At the height of the boom, it seemed possible for dot. com’s to go public and raise substantial amounts of money even if they had never earned any profits, and in some cases had not even earned any revenues. On March 10, 2000, the Nasdaq composite ind ex peaked at more than double its value just a year before. After the bursting of the bubble, many dot. com’s ran out of capital and were acquired or filed for bankruptcy (examples of the latter include WorldCom and Pets. com). The U. S. economy started to slow down and business nvestments began falling. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may have exacerbated the stock market downturn by adversely affecting investor sentiment. By 2002:Q3, the Nasdaq index had fallen by 78%, wiping out $5 trillion in market value of mostly technology firms. Figure 3 Panel D shows how abnormal liquidity creation behaved before, during, and after the bursting of the dot. com bubble and the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The graph shows that before the crisis period, liquidity creation moved from displaying a negative abnormal value to displaying a positive abnormal value at the time the bubble burst.During the crisis, liquidity creation declined somewhat and hovered around the time trend by t he time the crisis was over. After the crisis, liquidity creation slowly started to pick up again. Financial crisis #5: Subprime lending crisis (2007:Q3 – ? ) The subprime lending crisis has been characterized by turmoil in financial markets as banks have experienced difficulty in selling loans in the syndicated loan market and in securitizing loans. Banks also seem to be reluctant to provide credit: they appear to have cut back their lending to firms and individuals, and have also been reticent to lend to each other.Risk premia have increased as evidenced by a higher premium over treasuries for mortgages and other bank products. Some banks have experienced massive losses in capital. For example, Citicorp had to raise about $40 billion in equity to cover subprime lending and other losses. Massive losses at Countrywide resulted in a takeover by Bank of America. Bear Stearns suffered a fatal loss in confidence and was sold at a fire-sale price to J. P. Morgan Chase with the Fed eral Reserve guaranteeing $29 billion in potential losses. Washington Mutual, the sixth-largest bank, became the biggest bank failure in the U.S. financial history. J. P. Morgan Chase purchased the banking business while the rest of the organization filed for bankruptcy. The Federal Reserve intervened in some 16 unprecedented ways in the market, extending its safety-net privileges to investment banks. In addition to lowering the discount rate sharply, it also began holding mortgage-backed securities and lending directly to investment banks. Subsequently, IndyMac Bank was seized by the FDIC after it suffered substantive losses and depositors had started to run on the bank. This failure is expected to cost the FDIC $4 billion – $8 billion.The FDIC intends to sell the bank. Congress also recently passed legislation to provide Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae with unlimited credit lines and possible equity injections to prop up these troubled organizations, which are considered too big to fail. Figure 3 Panel E shows abnormal liquidity creation before and during the first part of the subprime lending crisis. The graph suggests that liquidity creation displayed a high positive abnormal value that was increasing before the crisis hit, with abnormal liquidity creation around $0. 0 trillion entering the crisis, decreasing substantially after the crisis hit. A striking fact about this crisis compared to the other crises is the relatively high build-up of positive abnormal liquidity creation prior to the crisis. 4. 4. Behavior of some liquidity creation components around the two banking crises It is of particular interest to examine the behavior of some selected components of liquidity creation around the banking crises. As discussed above (Section 4. 3), numerous papers have focused on the credit crunch, examining lending behavior.These studies generally find that mortgage and business lending started to decline significantly during the crisis. Here we contrast the cr edit crunch experience with the current subprime lending crisis, and expand the components of liquidity creation that are examined. Rather than focusing on mortgages and business loans, we examine the two liquidity creation components that include these items – semi-liquid assets (primarily mortgages) and illiquid assets (primarily business loans). In addition, we analyze two other components of liquidity creation.We examine the behavior of liquid assets to address whether a decrease (increase) in semi-liquid assets and / or illiquid assets tended to be accompanied by an increase (decrease) in liquid assets. We also analyze the behavior of illiquid off-balance sheet guarantees (primarily loan commitments) to address whether illiquid assets and illiquid off-balance sheet guarantees move in tandem around banking crises and whether changes in one are more pronounced than the other. Figure 4 Panels A and B show the abnormal amount of four liquidity creation components around 17 h e credit crunch and the subprime lending crisis, respectively. For ease of comparison, the components are not weighted by weights of +? (illiquid assets and illiquid off-balance sheet guarantees), 0 (semiliquid assets), and –? (liquid assets). The abnormal amounts are obtained by detrending and deseasonalizing each liquidity creation component. Figure 4 Panel A shows that abnormal semi-liquid assets decreased slightly during the credit crunch, while abnormal illiquid assets and especially abnormal illiquid guarantees dropped significantly and turned negative.This picture suggests that these components fell increasingly below the trendline. The dramatic drop in abnormal illiquid assets and abnormal illiquid off-balance sheet guarantees (which carry positive weights) helps explain the significant decrease in abnormal liquidity creation during the credit crunch shown in Figure 3 Panel B. Figure 4 Panel B shows that these four components of abnormal liquidity creation were above the trendline before and during the subprime lending crisis.Illiquid assets and especially off-balance sheet guarantees move further and further above the trendline before the crisis, which helps explain the dramatic buildup in abnormal liquidity creation before the subprime lending crisis shown in Figure 3 Panel E. All four components of abnormal liquidity creation continued to increase at the beginning of the crisis. After the first quarter of the crisis, illiquid off-balance sheet guarantees showed a significant decrease, which helps explain the decrease in abnormal liquidity creation in Figure 3 Panel E.On the balance sheet, during the final quarter of the sample period (the third quarter of the crisis), abnormal semi-liquid and illiquid assets declined, while abnormal liquid assets increased. 4. 5. General conclusions from the results What do we learn from the various graphs in the previous analyses that indicate intertemporal patterns of liquidity creation and selected liquidi ty creation components around five financial crises? First, across all the financial crises, there seems to have been a significant build-up or drop-off of abnormal liquidity creation before the crisis.This is consistent with the notion that crises may be preceded by either â€Å"too much† or â€Å"too little† liquidity creation, although at this stage we offer this as tentative food for thought rather than as a conclusion. Second, there seem to be two main differences between banking crises and market-related crises. 18 The banking crises, namely the credit crunch and the subprime lending crisis, were both preceded by positive abnormal liquidity creation by banks, while two out of the three market-related crises were preceded by negative abnormal liquidity creation.In addition, during the two banking crises, the crises themselves seem to have exerted a noticeable influence on the pattern of aggregate liquidity creation by banks. Just prior to the credit crunch, abnorm al liquidity creation was positive and had started to trend upward, but reversed course and plunged quite substantially to become negative during and after the crisis. Just prior to the subprime lending crisis, aggregate liquidity creation was again abnormally positive and trending up, but began to decline during the crisis, although it remains abnormally high by historical standards.The other crises, which are less directly related to banks, did not seem to exhibit such noticeable impact. Third, liquidity creation has both decreased during crises (e. g. , the 1990-1992 credit crunch) and increased during crises (e. g. , the 1998 Russian debt crisis / LTCM bailout). Thus, liquidity creation likely both exacerbated and ameliorated the effects of crises. Fourth, off-balance sheet illiquid guarantees (primarily loan commitments) moved more than semi-liquid assets (primarily mortgages) and illiquid assets (primarily business loans) during banking crises.Fifth, while liquidity creation i s generally thought of as a financial intermediation service with positive economic value at the level of the individual bank and individual borrower (see Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001), our analysis hints at the existence of a â€Å"dark side† to liquidity creation. Specifically, it may be more than coincidence that the subprime lending crisis was preceded by a very high level of positive abnormal aggregate liquidity creation by banks relative to historical levels.The notion that this may have contributed to the subprime lending crisis is consistent with the findings that banks adopted lax credit standards (see Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2008, Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig 2008), which in turn could have led to an increase in credit availability and off-balance sheet guarantees. Thus, while Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) argue that financial fragility is needed to create liquidity, our analysis offers the intriguing possibility that the causality may be reversed a s well: too much liquidity creation may lead to financial fragility. 9 5. The effect of capital on banks’ competitive positions and profitability around financial crises This section focuses on the second goal of the paper – examining how bank capital affects banks’ competitive positions and profitability around financial crises. We first explain our methodology and provide summary statistics. We then present and discuss the empirical results. In an additional check, we examine whether the stock return performance of high- and low-capital listed banks is consistent with the competitive position and profitability results for large banks.In another check, we generate some â€Å"fake† crises to analyze whether our findings hold during â€Å"normal† times as well. 5. 1. Empirical approach To examine whether banks with high capital ratios improve their competitive positions and profitability during financial crises, and if so, whether they are able to h old on to this improved performance after these crises, we focus on the behavior of individual banks rather than that of the banking sector as a whole.Because our analysis of aggregate liquidity creation by banks shows substantial differences across crises, we do not pool the data from all the crises but instead analyze each crisis separately. Our findings below that the coefficients of interest differ substantially across crises tend to justify this separate treatment of the different crises. We use the following regression specification for each of the five crises: ? PERFi,j = ? + ? 1 * EQRATi,j + B * Zi,j (1) where ?PERFi,j is the change in bank i’s performance around crisis j, EQRATi,j is the bank’s average capital ratio before the crisis, and Zi,j includes a set of control variables averaged over the pre-crisis period. All of these variables are discussed in Section 5. 2. Since we use a cross-sectional regression model, bank and year fixed effects are not included . In all regressions, t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. Given documented differences between large and small banks in terms of portfolio composition (e. g. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005) and the effect of capital on liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman forthcoming), we split the sample into large and small banks, and run all regressions separately for these two sets of banks. Large banks have gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $1 billion at the end of the quarter preceding the crisis and small banks have GTA up to 20 $1 billion at the end of that quarter. 5. 2. Variable descriptions and summary statistics We use two measures of a bank’s performance: competitive position and profitability.The bank’s competitive position is measured as the bank’s market share of overall liquidity creation, i. e. , the dollar amount of liquidity created by the bank divided by the dollar amount of liquidity created by the industry. Our focus on the share of liquidity creation is a departure from the traditional focus on a bank’s market share of deposits. Liquidity creation is a more comprehensive measure of banking activities since it does not just consider one funding item but instead is based on all the bank’s on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities.To establish whether banks improve their competitive positions during the crisis, we define the change in liquidity creation market share, ? LCSHARE, as the bank’s average market share during the crisis minus its average market share over the eight quarters before the crisis, normalized by its average pre-crisis market share. To examine whether these banks hold on to their improved performance after the crisis, we also measure each bank’s average market share over the eight quarters after the crisis minus its average market share over the eight quarters before the crisis, again normalized by its average marke t share before the crisis.The second performance measure is the bank’s profitability, measured as the return on equity (ROE), i. e. , net income divided by stockholders equity. 23 To examine whether a bank improves its profitability during a crisis, we focus on the change in profitability, ? ROE, measured as the bank’s average ROE during the crisis minus the bank’s average ROE over the eight quarters before the crisis. 24 To analyze whether the bank is able to hold on to improved profitability, we focus on the bank’s average ROE over the eight quarters after the crisis minus its average ROE over the eight quarters before the crisis.To mitigate the influence of outliers, ? LCSHARE and ? ROE are winsorized at the 3% level. Furthermore, to ensure that average values are calculated based on a sufficient number of quarters, we 23 We use ROE, the bank’s net income divided by equity, rather than return on assets (ROA), net income divided by assets, since banks may have substantial off-balance sheet portfolios. Banks must allocate capital against every offbalance sheet activity they engage in. Hence, net income and equity both reflect the bank’s on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities.In contrast, ROA divides net income earned based on on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities merely by the size of the on-balance sheet activities. 24 We do not divide by the bank’s ROE before the crisis since ROE itself is already a scaled variable. 21 require that at least half of a bank’s pre-crisis / crisis / post-crisis observations are available for both performance measures around a crisis. Since the subprime lending crisis was still ongoing at the end of the sample period, we require that at least half of a bank’s pre-subprime crisis observations and all three quarters of its subprime crisis observations are available.The key exogenous variable is EQRAT, the bank’s capital ratio averaged over the eight quarters before the crisis. EQRAT is the ratio of equity capital to gross total assets, GTA. 25 The control variables include: bank size, bank risk, bank holding company membership, local market competition, and proxies for the economic environment. Bank size is controlled for by including lnGTA, the log of GTA, in all regressions. In addition, we run regressions separately for large and small banks. We include the z-score to control for bank risk. 26 The z-score indicates the bank’s distance from default (e. g. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt 1993), with higher values indicating that a bank is less likely to default. It is measured as a bank’s return on assets plus the equity capital/GTA ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets over the eight quarters before the crisis. To control for bank holding company status, we include D-BHC, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank was part of a bank holding company. Bank holding company membership m ay affect a bank’s competitive position because the holding company is required to act as a source of strength to all the banks it owns, and may also inject equity voluntarily when needed.In addition, other banks in the holding company provide cross-guarantees. Furthermore, Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) find that bank loan growth depends on BHC membership. We control for local market competition by including HERF, the bank-level HerfindahlHirschman index of deposit concentration for the markets in which the bank is p